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Abstract
It is well recognized that intellectual property rights (IPR) violations are at the
heart of the economic conflict with China. Little agreement, however, exists
about the origin and solutions for this provocation. Broadly speaking, two
prescriptions have been proposed: the natural evolutionary and the rule of law
views. While both have merits and add to our understanding, they do not go far
enough to address the more fundamental IPR policy issue: China has benefited
from a rule of law overseas and a rule through law at home, manufacturing
unfair advantage to its firms, many of which are owned and/or influenced by
the government. While recognizing China’s recent effort in improving IPR
protection, we point out the intrinsic contradiction in the political economy of
China between maintaining the one-party rule, on the one hand, and
protecting IPR by an independent court, on the other. Understanding this
tension in the application of IPR law can help the international community
search for more effective policy options.
Journal of International Business Policy (2019).
https://doi.org/10.1057/s42214-019-00032-x
Keywords: IPR protection; China; party-state; governance; rule through law; institutional
duality
The online version of this article is available Open Access
INTRODUCTION
In the debate on China’s IPR violation issues, there exists a gap: no
studies have delved into the political and economic system of
China that fundamentally defines the issues. In this essay, we argue
that the unique political and economic system of China, the party-
state (described below), is the most important factor that has
shaped and continues to shape the IPR issues for China. Without an
adequate understanding of such a system, the discussion on
China’s IPR issues is not only incomplete, but also leads to
unrealistic policies for the international community.
There are two prevailing and competing views on China’s IPR
issue. The first one, which we may call the ‘‘natural evolutionary’’
view, argues that China’s path to IPR protection is similar to that of
the United States historically and will evolve into a strong IPR
protection regime as China develops more IPR itself (Peng,
Ahlstrom, Carraher, & Shi, 2017). Such an approach implies that
Received: 4 March 2019
Revised: 15 July 2019
Accepted: 3 August 2019
Journal of International Business Policy (2019)
© 2019 The Author(s) All rights reserved 2522-0691/19
www.jibp.net * Open 
the US, European Union, and other large econo-
mies should simply nudge China to comply with
international law and implement regulation con-
sistent with international standards. The second
view, which we may term as the ‘‘rule of law’’ view,
regards the systemic and severe violation of IPR in
China as the result of disregarding the rule of law
by the Chinese government, and the international
community must pressure it to change in order to
protect the global IPR market (Brander, Cui, &
Vertinsky, 2017). This view implies that the rule-
based countries should punish China for violating
the rules and force it from the outside to comply or
suffer the consequences. The two views differ in
their assumptions about the pathology of institu-
tional change and, thus, the appropriate policy
response. Both views suffer from a narrow lens of
Chinese IPR policy and insufficiently account of
the active role taken by the Chinese communist
party (the state) in creating a self-serving political
economy.
Furthermore, a weakness that exists in most
discussions of China’s IPR is the failure to clearly
distinguish China the country (people) from China
the state. Most articles just simply state that China
violates IPR. By ‘‘China,’’ do they mean the Chinese
state, Chinese firms (and people), or both? In our
analysis, we try to make it clear that when we refer
to ‘‘the state’’ we are actually referring more
precisely to ‘‘the party-state,’’ since the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) is the state. The debate
between the natural-evolutionary and the rule-of-
law views of IPR in China can be better understood
if we analyze CCP’s motivations and interests from
a political economy perspective, which focuses on
the preservation of the party’s monopoly as its
central goal (China International Publishing
Group, Academy of Contemporary China and
World Studies, & China Academy of Translation,
2019: 29).
THE DEBATE AND CRITIQUE
The Natural Evolutionary View and Our Critique
Broadly speaking, the natural evolutionary view is a
subset of what may be called the ‘‘engagement’’
school (Bader, 2018; Shambaugh, 1996), which
argues that even though China is ruled by a
communist party that puts itself above the law
and does not want to be bound by internationally
recognized rules, as the Chinese economy grows,
Chinese firms will get bigger and the Chinese
people will get richer. As early as in the late
1980s, political economists had begun to argue
that it was conducive to China’s institutional
change for communist officials to be corrupt and
get rich first, because once they were wealthy, they
would want the legal protection for their property
(e.g., Yang, 1988: 29). Following the evolutionary
examples from Western democracies, these societal
changes will unleash demand for more business
and personal (including IP) rights leading to the
adoption of a rule of law in business and ultimately
democracy in politics. Based on this assumption,
the mature democracies should not criticize the
Chinese Communist Party too much, and instead,
should encourage the party-state to engage in inter-
national business. China’s entry to the WTO in
2001 paved by the Bill Clinton administration was
a natural extension of this philosophy, expected to
benefit American workers, consumers, and busi-
nesses (Lipton, 2018). By entering the WTO, China
agreed to lower trade barriers and abide by the
trading club rules of international business, includ-
ing the protection of IPR.
Along with this line of reasoning, and encour-
aged by the collapse of communism in Eastern
Europe, scholars of institutional studies have devel-
oped a genre of research on ‘‘institutional change,’’
which examines the rapid changes in the political,
economic, and social (cultural) systems from com-
munism to liberal democracy (Fukuyama, 1989).
Starting around the late 1990s, institutional schol-
ars (Li, Li, & Zhang, 2000; Qian & Weingast, 1997)
had implicitly assumed that the change is one-way:
from communist dictatorship and central planning
to democracy and the free market. The question
was not whether the change will occur, but at what
speed and how it will occur. As far as we know, there
have been no studies examining how and why a
communist society in transition (to democracy and
capitalism) may stall and even reserve the course in
transition. No one thought the reverse was possi-
ble. Up until recently, the US policy vis-È-vis China
was one of engagement with these theoretical
considerations in mind.
The engagement and natural evolutionary view
was challenged by the actual developmental path
of the Chinese economy, from which a new form of
state capitalism has emerged (Musacchio & Laz-
zarini, 2014). In the course of 20 years or so, the
party-state and its officials have realized that it is
actually beneficial to increase, not decrease, the
party’s control and to not embrace the rule of law
so that they can continue to acquire more wealth
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through power (and some can move their (ill-
gained) wealth overseas for better legal protection).
As for the developmental strategy, the party-state
has been practicing an industrial policy that mobi-
lizes resources to develop strategic industries, pro-
tecting them from global competition while
enjoying the openness of the global market (Wen,
2019). Lipton (2018) wrote that ‘‘China has
embraced a sort of È la carte globalization, adopting
the rules and standards it finds most useful – like
the ability to expand its companies and invest-
ments abroad – while discarding those that threa-
ten its unique political and economic model.’’
The active participation of the state in the
economy has eroded the boundary between state
ownership and state influence (Buckley, Clegg, &
Tan, 2005). The blurring distinction between gov-
ernment owned/influenced and private can be seen
in the case of Huawei. The government steers
economic activities directly through owning enter-
prises and indirectly through governance, funding,
procurement, and incentives both within firms and
outside. Chinese Internet companies have to com-
ply with regulations that give monitoring and
control to the authorities (Council of Foreign
Relations, 2017). While all countries exercise some
government directives in economic and security
operations (The White House, 2019), the scope and
scale of government intervention in China is more
pervasive. For example, much of the investments
abroad by very large Chinese firms are motivated by
government directives (Alon, Wang, Shen, &
Zhang, 2014). The government’s totalitarian
approach to policy means that in fighting trade
wars, for example, China can use consumer boy-
cotts, excessive and intrusive inspections, direc-
tives, and administrative holdups in customs
instead of plain tariffs to selectively target firms,
industries, and home regions (The Economist,
2019).
Theoretically, a country that is large and is ruled
by an authoritarian state can close its market (but
demands other countries to open their markets)
and concentrate the whole country’s resources into
developing a few key industries (Wen, 2019). Once
the state-blessed firm has achieved the economies
of scale and low costs in a key industry, it can enter
other countries to defeat its competitors there. The
state can repeat the policy in all key industries to
dominate these industries in the world (Fligstein &
Zhang, 2009; Hudson Institute, 2018; Wen, 2019).
Empirically, there are cases in China that fit this
pattern. For example, both the Chinese railway and
telecommunications (service carrier) sectors are
monopolized by the state and shielded from foreign
competition. Under the state’s support, the state-
owned train maker, CRR, after heavily copying
Siemens and Alstom, among others, has become
the world’s largest low-cost train producer and has
expanded into many countries including the U.S.
(Gu, 2019). In the telecommunications industry,
China Mobile has expanded into more than 20
countries (Tencent, 2018). In the aerospace indus-
try, the government quest for dual-use (military
and civilian) technologies has led it to buy, steal,
reverse engineer, codevelop/coproduce through
forced technology transfers, and use cyber espi-
onage in order to develop indigenous capabilities
(Saunders and Wiseman, 2011).
On a more systematic level, the party-state has
pursued two strategies: the Made in China 2025
aimed at propelling China’s high-tech and
advanced manufacturing base to global leadership
(Hickey, 2019), and the Road and Belt Initiative
seeking to export its excessive construction and
supply capability and acquire strategic assets by
building roads, bridges, and sea lanes, financing
large infrastructural projects, and selling their
companies’ products and services to many coun-
tries (Zhang, Alon, & Lattemann, 2018). Currently,
China is perhaps the only country that can practice
this type of industrial policy due to its size and
scale, accumulated financial resources, and a gov-
ernance structure that allows the state to command
and control the economy. Under the strategy of the
party-state-capitalism, China’s economy has
become the world’s largest, with a GDP of $23
trillion based on purchasing power parity (PPP) in
2017 (U.S.’s GDP is $19 trillion in 2017) (CIA,
2019). While its per-capita income ($16,700 in
2017, PPP-based) has well surpassed the $6,000 per-
capita income threshold for democratic transition
based on worldwide statistics (Pei, 2012), democra-
tization did not happen, and the rule of law is still
absent.
The Rule of Law View and Our Critique
That the Chinese party-state does not follow the
rule of law is the cause of IPR violation in China has
been recognized by the second view, the rule-of-law
view. While we agree that the rule of law is a
necessary condition for fair engagement, we believe
that the rule-of-law view needs to be expanded for
the following two reasons. First, domestically, it
does not go far enough to provide a broader and
more fundamental understanding on the internal
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institutional setting in China that presents an
insurmountable obstacle for the country to adopt
the rule of law. Second, internationally, it does not
point out the party-state actually effectively and
efficiently uses the rule of law to advance its
interest globally. The evolving legal case of Huawei
in North America provides an illustrative example:
(1) Chinese officials, who do not allow China to
have judicial independence, demand judicial inde-
pendence in the case of Meng in Canada (Reuters,
2019), and (2) Huawei, based in China that does
not allow firms to sue the government, constitu-
tional review or checks and balances, sues the US
government for the violation of constitution and
checks and balances (Strumpf, 2019). Third, con-
ceptually, in its arguments, the distinction between
private and public players in China is not clearly
recognized. As such, the issue cannot be under-
stood to its full extent, and the policy response may
be inadequate. Below we elaborate further our
arguments, which we hope will enhance the
discussion and understanding of the IPR issues
relating to China.
BEYOND IPR: CHINA’S POLITICAL ECONOMY
AND RULE THROUGH LAW
So far, the discussion on China’s IPR issue tends to
be limited on the IPR protection per se: the players
– to borrow the institutional theory’s analogy
(North, 1990) – domestic firms –violate the IPR of
foreign firms, and the referee – the Chinese state –
fails to enforce the law equally and fairly. The scope
of discussion on this issue is insufficient because it
fails to distinguish private action (violations by
individuals and firms) and public action (violations
by governments) in IPR violation (Hill & Hult,
2019) and that the distinction between private and
public actions is fuzzy – the Chinese party-state is
both a player and referee in the game.1
In countries of early developmental stage, the
violation of IPR tends to be by private actors, which
is commonly the result of the state lacking laws or
the will to enforce them, or the result of the state
favoring domestic firms over foreign entities, as in
the IPR protection history of developed countries
show (Ben-Atar, 1995; Hill & Hult, 2019; SÄiz &
Castro, 2017). In newly independent America,
facing British technology embargo, the govern-
ment of the desperate infant nation encouraged
and rewarded Americans to acquire foreign IPR,
especially from Britain, legally or illegally (Ben-
Atar, 1995). Peng et al. (2017) cited historical
research on US lack of IPR protection (Raustiala &
Sprigman, 2012, 2013), especially in publications
and entertainment (Lohr, 2002). Surowieski (2014)
suggested that the US should not blame China for
doing what it did with IP as it has itself become a
scientific superpower through industrial spying, via
direct observation, immigration of skilled workers
with insider knowledge, smuggled machines, and
pirated materials and technology. The U.S. used
high import tariffs, government subsidies, assis-
tance for skilled workers to migrate out of Britain
(which was illegal according to British law), and
industrial espionage (using only naked eyes of
course) to jump-start the manufacturing industry
in the U.S. The biographies of Alexander Hamilton
also detailed how he directly intervened in ‘‘ob-
taining’’ industrial technologies from Britain, and
how the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
knowingly granted patents to those who ‘‘copied’’
the technology from Britain (McDonald, 1979).2
The arguments on the historical US violations gave
fuel to the evolutionary view, but historical com-
parisons have their limits.
In contrast to the USA, the global IPR acquisition
by the party-state of China is a systematic effort
that is large in scale and scope and involved an
intelligence agency, the police force, and the
military (Hickey, 2019; Wray, 2019). Evidence
shows the party-state not only sponsors IPR theft
and forced IPR transfer but also conducts them
(Davis & Wei, 2019; Hudson Institute, 2018;
Spegele & O’Keeffe, 2018; Wei & Davis, 2018).
Several cases demonstrate how the Chinese gov-
ernment rigs the outcomes on IPR disputes between
Chinese and foreign firms. According to a Wall
Street Journal report, when DuPont Co.’s Shanghai
office reported suspected IPR violation by its Chi-
nese partner to the Chinese authorities, the Chi-
nese police raided DuPont’s office, demanded
passwords, printed documents, seized computers,
and intimidated DuPont employees. Instead of
helping DuPont to protect its property, the state
uses ‘‘an array of levers to pry away American
intellectual property’’ (Wei & Davis, 2018). In
another case, the Chinese state orchestrated and
funded the acquisition of a new satellite technol-
ogy developed by Boeing though a startup in the U.
S. with a made-up purpose to use the satellite to
‘‘improve web access in Africa.’’ However, the real
intention was to steal the technology, which can be
used in the space program. When the seller refused
and brought the case to a U.S. court, the lawyers of
the buyer said the U.S. court did not have
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jurisdiction over a China-based company, and
suing a state-owned firm in China ‘‘heightens the
affront to China’s sovereignty’’ (Spegele & O’Keeffe,
2018).
The Chinese state also uses a number of policies
to facilitate IPR transfer. One is ‘‘adverse adminis-
trative approvals and licensing processes,’’ which
the state uses ‘‘as a tool to extract…concessions,
usually on technology.’’ Another is ‘‘burdensome
and intrusive testing,’’ which is ‘‘a way of extracting
information and technology,’’ according to White
House National Trade Council Director Peter
Navarro (Hudson Institute, 2018). In industries
deemed ‘‘strategic’’ by the state, full ownership by
foreigners is not allowed, and multinational com-
panies are required to form joint ventures with
local firms for production and distribution in
return for advanced know-how and technology
(O’Connor, 2019).
To understand why the Chinese state does that,
we must go beyond IPR and look into the political
economy of China. China is ruled by one party
with an elaborate system of political, social, and
economic controls (McGregor, 2010). Unlike the
political parties in democracies, which are open to
everyone without formal membership, the Chinese
Communist Party is a Leninist party (Chou &
Nathan, 1987) with the following characteristics:
(1) it is based on the communist ideology, which
gives the party the exclusive mandate to rule; (2) it
relies on exclusive membership; (3) it is a highly
centralized organization with a central committee,
a politburo, and a general secretariat that holds
unchecked supreme power; and (4) it has three key
departments: the organizational department, the
propaganda department, and the united front work
department. Under these principles, the party
designs and controls all of the functional and
geographic sections of the governmental system,
making the party the state. Economically, the
party-state controls a large amount of the economic
resources of the country through its orders and
state ownership. For example, the party-state con-
trols about 56% of the GDP through taxes, fees, and
SOEs (in comparison, the U.S. government controls
32%) (IMF, 2019; National Bureau of Statistics of
China, 2016, 2018). To maintain the one-party
rule, the party cannot allow judiciary indepen-
dence and various interest groups to be repre-
sented, such as the interest for better IPR
protection. The party-state follows rule through
law (or rule by law) as opposed to the rule of law,
namely, the party uses the law subjectively and
selectively for the purpose of maintaining its rule.
As pointed out by Rod Rosenstein, Deputy Attorney
General of the U.S., in China ‘‘the law is an
instrument of state power, a mechanism for rulers
to maintain control and quash dissent’’ (U.S.
Department of Justice, 2019).
To maintain its legitimacy, the party must keep
economic growth at a high level. To achieve it,
acquiring new technologies is imperative. The
quickest way to do it is to obtain them from the
holders of the technologies as opposed to develop-
ing them from scratch, which does not necessarily
mean to obtain them illegally. However, given the
fact that the party puts itself above any laws,
compared to the rule of law-based states, the
Chinese party-state is less concerned or restricted
from using illegal means to obtain needed
technologies.
Due to the secrecy of IPR violation and the
reluctance of victims to report it for fear of retribu-
tion and embarrassment (Sullivan, 2019), compre-
hensive statistics of IPR violation related to the
Chinese party-state do not exist, to our knowledge,
but circumstantial evidence does exist. Studies
using statistical data on China’s IPR issues tend to
focus on patent application and dispute, because
data on patents are easier to get (Bian, 2017;
Prud’homme, 2019; Rassenfosse & Raiteri, 2017).
The findings are mixed. Prud’homme (2019) argues
that framing the IPR protection regime as strong or
weak may not capture the essence of the issue, and
proposes to use ‘‘foreign-friendliness’’ to measure
the regional variation in IPR protection and risk for
foreign firms within China, implying the arbitrari-
ness of IPR protection in China. Rassenfosse and
Raiteri (2017) found no evidence of discrimination
against foreign patent applicants overall, but that
‘‘foreign applications in technology fields that are
of strategic importance to China are four to seven
percentage points less likely to be approved than
local applications, all else equal’’ (p. 1). Bian (2017)
found an overall high winning rate in patent
infringement cases and higher winning rate for
foreign patent holders, without specifying whether
foreign winners have more merit in their cases or
whether the Chinese government gave foreign
entities preferential treatment. Patent application
and disputes are one aspect of IPR protection. The
IPR issue at the center of the current debate goes
beyond the patent application rate or win rate in
patent infringement and focuses on espionage,
state-sponsored theft, and forced technology
transfer.
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According to Navarro, the Chinese state uses up
to 50 measures to achieve six strategic goals: protect
the Chinese market from competition in imports,
expand the global share of markets, secure the core
resources of the world, dominate traditional man-
ufacturing industries, obtain advanced technolo-
gies, and develop emerging high-tech industries
that will drive future growth and advancements in
the defense industry (Hudson Institute, 2018).
Adam Hickey, U.S. Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, reported that since the Made in China 2025
plan was published in 2015, the U.S. government
has charged Chinese individuals and entities, most
of which were directed or sponsored by, or related
to the Chinese government, with IP theft, impli-
cating at least eight of the ten sectors specified in
the plan. ‘‘[S]ince 2011, more than 90% of the [U.S.
Justice] Department’s economic espionage prose-
cutions (i.e., cases alleging trade secret theft by or
to benefit a foreign state) involve China, and more
than two-thirds of all federal trade secret theft cases
during that period have had at least a geographical
nexus to China’’ (Hickey, 2019).
China’s IPR violation has been noticed by both
Democratic and Republican administrations in the
USA. In 1992, President George H.W. Bush negoti-
ated an agreement with China to improve IPR
protection in China. Later, President Clinton’s
administration raised the issue of piracy many
times with China, but these efforts did not seem
to work. ‘‘The pirates were just warming up. The
next year, estimated software piracy jumped by
about US$100 million [from US$225 million];…94
percent of all the packaged software in use in China
was pirated’’ (Boxwell, 2018). In 2013, President
Obama raised the issue of cybersecurity and IPR
with Chinese President Xi. Obama ‘‘underscored
the importance of working together… to address
issues such as the protection of intellectual prop-
erty rights.’’ According to his staff, ‘‘but his tone
was not confrontational’’ (Chabrow, 2013) and, as
the following comments by the Trump administra-
tion officials show, the violation has become
systematically larger in scale and scope.
Christopher Wray, the Director of U.S. Federal
Bureau of Investigation, stated that ‘‘China has
pioneered a societal approach to stealing innova-
tion any way it can, from a wide array of businesses,
universities, organizations, and countries. They’re
doing this through Chinese intelligence services,
through state-owned enterprises, through ostensi-
bly private companies, through graduate students
and researchers, and through a variety of actors
working on behalf of China’’ (Wray, 2019). In
describing the scale and impact of the Chinese
state’s intelligence collection effort, Rob Joyce, a
senior cybersecurity adviser at the U.S. National
Security Agency, said other countries may be a
‘‘hurricane,’’ but ‘‘China is climate change: long,
slow, pervasive’’ (Viswanatha & Volz, 2019).
THE FALLACY THAT CHINA’S IPR PROTECTION
WILL IMPROVE AS MORE CHINESE FIRMS
INNOVATE
A major argument by the natural-evolution view is
that as more and more Chinese firms develop their
own new technologies and IPR, they will demand
that their government better enforce IPR protec-
tion, and the government will realize that the
benefit of doing it is greater than the cost, so that
the government will improve IPR protection, which
will benefit not only the domestic but also foreign
firms.
This natural evolutionary view can be true for
democracies, because as domestic firms develop
more IPR, they will demand more protection
through their representatives in policy-making.
Furthermore, mature democracies go hand in hand
with neutral and fair rule of law, so foreign firms
tend to be treated equally as opposed to those in
autocratic countries (U.S. Department of Justice,
2019). Indeed, that is what happened in the U.S.
regarding the evolution of IPR protection. Its
democratic system allowed and even encouraged
the public participation in the IPR protection
debate, which, along with U.S.’s economic devel-
opment and global engagement, counter-balanced
the discrimination against foreign IP holders, and
facilitated U.S.’s evolution toward a strong IPR
protection regime (Ben-Atar, 1995; SÄiz & Castro,
2017).
In the case of China, indeed, there are signs that
as the Chinese economy develops, the government
is making effort to better protect IPR. For example,
China has been a member of the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) since 1980. WIPO
charter in the UN is to promote the protection of
intellectual property around the world. Of the 11.8
million patents in the world in 2016, 2.8 million
were in the US and 1.8 million in China (WIPO,
2017), which shows that China hopes to receive
protection for its IPR worldwide. However, such an
effort has limited results due to China’s political
system internally.
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In China, first, there are no systematic, open, and
fair channels for the IPR owners to demand inde-
pendent and impartial court for IPR, and the party
has the absolute power to decide on such matters;
second, the party-state has its own agenda in its
policies, which may or may not choose to protect
IPR at any particular time or industry. For example,
if prosecuting a firm for IPR violation may reduce
tax revenue and employment, or if the offending
firm has a stronger relationship with the party than
the victim, the party may decide not to proceed.
Third, in general, stealing technologies is cheaper
and faster than developing them. That the cost of
stealing is higher as a country develops its own IPR
is true if the government of the country applies IPR
laws consistently to all IPR owners. However, if the
government can selectively apply the law and favor
certain (domestic or connected) owners, it can still
allow or even encourage getting foreign IPRs
illegally without hurting its domestic IPR owners.
China has become the largest economy in the
world with a per-capita income of $16,700, but its
IPR violation has not been noticeably improved.
Citing senior U.S. Justice Department officials, a
Wall Street Journal article reported that ‘‘more than
90% of economic-espionage prosecutions over the
past decade…have involved China’’ (Viswanatha &
Volz, 2019).
The best protection of IPR is by the rule of law,
which the party-state rejects. In August 2018,
President Xi said that the Chinese Communist
Party must strengthen its leadership over the law.
The party will not imitate other countries’ models
or practices. It will never follow the road leading to
judiciary independence. In the ‘‘international bat-
tle front’’, China must use laws as a weapon to fight
against challengers. China will actively participate
in the international rule setting. ‘‘We want to be
the participant, initiator, and leader of global
governance reform and development’’ (Mai,
2019). Since the party is above and dictates the
law, the desire to strengthen IPR must be a party-
led effort instead of following the rule of law.
Furthermore, the party intends to project its gov-
ernance internationally, causing concerns from
other countries, as former U.S. President Obama
commented on why the U.S. should participate in
the Trans-Pacific Partnership, ‘‘we can rewrite the
rules of trade…if we don’t… China…will step into
fill that void’’ (The White House, 2015).
We may be able to prove that as more Chinese
firms develop more of their own IPR, it would be
beneficial for them and maybe even to the Chinese
economy as a whole to improve its IPR laws and
enforcement (let us assume that the party recog-
nizes the benefit of doing so and further that it can
be done under the party’s rule). Using the institu-
tional theory language, when there are potential
increasing returns to institutional changes, some
actors will do it (North, 1990). However, there are a
number of key questions that need to be answered.
First, it is clear that the leaders of the party-state
fear that establishing the rule of law will end the
party’s authoritarian rule. So how should this be
satisfactorily addressed for the party leaders so that
they will establish the rule of law? Second, assum-
ing the benefit is more than enough to benefit the
Chinese economy as a whole and to buy out the
party officials so that they would agree to the
change, how could it be carried out? Since the
party-state severely punishes anyone who chal-
lenges the party, who is going to carry it out?
Responding to the calls by its trading partners,
especially the U.S., to change its unfair trade
practice, the party-state has made great efforts to
address the issue. In April 2018, Chinese President
Xi Jinping said that ‘‘China will strengthen protec-
tion of international property rights’’ (Xinhua,
2018). In January 2019, the Supreme People’s Court
enacted a national appellate court for civil and
administrative IP cases (Robinson, 2019), and the
Standing Committee of the National People’s Con-
gress of China published a draft amendment to the
Patent Law intended to enhance patent-owner’s
rights (Covington, 2019). In April 2019, President
Xi reassured that ‘‘China will step up protecting the
legitimate rights and interests of foreign owners of
intellectual property rights, and prohibit the forced
transfer of technology’’ (Xinhua, 2019).
It is very clear that these measures and state-
ments from the party leader show that the party-
state wants to improve its IPR protection. Interna-
tional media widely reported this positive develop-
ment, but the most fundamental cause of the issue
is not that China does not have written laws
protecting IPR; it is that the party is above the law
and uses law as a tool for its goal. Many of these
written rules are just ink on paper. It is well known
that some laws are not meant to be enforced, such
as the rights to vote and to free speech printed in
the Chinese Constitution. Furthermore, depending
on its policy imperatives at any given time, the
party gives conflicting signals.
Facing both the international pressure to make
changes and the pressure from the party hardliners
to resist, in December 2018, President Xi said: ‘‘For
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those that ought to be changed or can be changed,
we will change; but for those that shouldn’t be
changed or cannot be changed, we will firmly not
change’’ (South China Morning Post, 2018). This
implies that he or the party is the sole decider on
what to change and not to change. In May 2019, in
the late-stage trade negotiation with the U.S. and
when the world expected the signing of an
impending agreement, the Chinese government
backtracked on almost all the terms upon it had
agreed, including implementing stronger legal pro-
tections of IPR and enforcement verification mech-
anisms. Among the contentious issues were that
the Chinese side wanted to the keep the agreement
informal rather than writing it down in a legal
document, and they did not like to be monitored
by the U.S. (Lawder, Mason, & Martina, 2019).
Summarizing these (conflicting) signals, we may
conjecture that the party-state does want to change
some of its unfair trade practices, such as resolving
some IPR disputes in foreign entities’ favor, but these
changes have to be by the party’s order rather than
by a legal reform such as establishing an indepen-
dent and impartial court or relying on outside
monitoring (Tang, 2018). As the above quotation
of President Xi indicated, if the party feels it can be
changed, it will make some changes. However,
without the rule of law, expedient change can be
easily reversed when the pressure is alleviated.
Under the party’s rule, improving IPR protection
by adopting the rule of law, which would constitute
a major step forward in China’s institutional
change, is out of the question, because doing so
may threaten the party’s rule, even though such a
change may benefit China as a whole (RFA, 2019).
While North recognized that the increasing returns
to institutional changes may be blocked by vested
groups so that some ‘‘discontinuous change’’ must
be taken, such as revolution, he immediately wrote
that ‘‘I do not provide a theory of revolution, which
is an enormous literature’’ (North, 1990: 89).
CHANGES DUE TO OUTSIDE VERSUS INSIDE
PRESSURE
The rule-of-law view argues that ‘‘other countries
should take action to pressure China to meet its IPR
obligation’’ (Brander et al., 2017). While we agree
with this, we further argue that without internal
forces for the change, external pressure has rather
limited effects. A logical deduction may help us
better understand this. If the party-state allows its
court to independently and impartially rule on IPR
cases involving foreign plaintiffs, the domestic
victims of IPR violation will demand the same
treatment, and other legal disputes may follow
suite. As such, the trend will eventually threaten
the one-party rule, as an independent judiciary
may rule against it. Therefore, the issue is ulti-
mately an issue of establishing the rule of law in
China. For a change of this magnitude to occur,
while outside pressure helps, inside forces must
coalesce to initiate and carry it out.
In the late 1970s, when the party-state started
opening up, it followed Deng Xiaoping’s strategy of
‘‘taoguang yanghui’’ (), which has been translated by
the Chinese official media as ‘‘hide one’s capabilities
and bide one’s time’’ or ‘‘hide one’s ambitions and
disguise its claws’’ (China Daily, 2010). The implicit
intention of the strategy is to dominate the world
once the party-state is ready. The strategy had
worked well to the party-state’s advantage, facili-
tated by the engagement policy of mature democ-
racies. Around 2013, when Xi Jinping assumed the
leadership, evidently the party-state began to feel
that it was ready to show its claws, which has alerted
the world, prompting many in the Chinese govern-
ment that the showing is premature. Evidence
shows that the party now wants to go back to
‘‘taoguang yanghui.’’ For example, ‘‘Made in China
2025’’ has been banned from media by the party.
This further indicates that the party-state’s recent
promise to improve its IPR protection for foreign
entities may only be biding its time.
Another issue relating to the external pressure is
the asymmetrical nature of the issue. A major
challenge in the frictions between democracies
and totalitarian states is the former’s right is totally
restricted in the latter, and the latter enjoys its full
legal rights in the former, as shown in the criminal
investigation of ZTE and Huawei in the U.S. and
Canada. Regardless how controversial the cases
may be, the contrast between following the rule
of law and using the law as a tool is clear. The
investigated parties from China enjoy the full legal
rights, the best law firms, and free media coverage
with competing views. While comparable cases in
China are kept secretive and in which the charges
tend to be arbitrary and in retaliation against any
foreign countries who criticize or take legal actions
against Chinese government, firms, or individuals
for alleged wrongdoings, as pointed out by the
Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein (U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice, 2017, 2019; U.S. District Court,
2019) and shown in the National Public Radio
report (Sullivan, 2019).
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How has the Chinese party-state been able to
enjoy such an unfair practice for so long? A card
game that one of the authors uses in his strategy
class (introduced by Adam Brandenburger and Barry
Nalebuff (1997) can illustrate this point. The teacher
holds the 26 black cards and hand out the 26 red
cards to 26 students. A deal (a pairing) between a
black card and a red card will be worth $100, and an
unmatched card will be worthless. Accordingly, each
of the 26 students comes to the teacher in turn to
make a deal on how the student and the teacher can
split the $100. Since an unmatched card is worthless
for the student as well as for the teacher, the
students have the same bargaining power that the
teacher does. Furthermore, it would be logical to
assume that the students and the teacher would split
the $100 equally. However, the teacher then pub-
licly throws away two cards and begins the negoti-
ation. Realizing that two of them will have no
match, the students are desperate to make any deals
with the teacher. In many deals, the teacher only
agrees to give the student $1! The Chinese party-
state, monopolizing the access to China, makes it
clear that some of the foreign countries or firms will
not have access to China. Realizing that, foreign
states, firms, and individuals tend to avoid criticiz-
ing IPR violations in China for fear of being denied
access to China (Working Group on Chinese Influ-
ence Activities in the United States, 2018).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the global history of IPR protection and viola-
tion, China stands out for the following reasons.
First and foremost is its political system in which
the Communist Party intends to rule forever. This
makes it categorically different from the IPR pro-
tection evolution of most democracies, especially
the U.S., in which the democratic participation
played a key role in adopting the global standard
for IPR protection. Second is its size. When the U.S.
was an IPR violator in the late 18th century to the
early 19th century, its economy was small, account-
ing for about one-fiftieth of the world’s GDP
(Drabble, 2019). China today accounts for about
nearly one-fifth of the world’s GDP, at $23 trillion
(CIA, 2019), of which the Communist Party con-
trols about 56%. The combination of these two
factors makes the impact of China’s IPR issue
beyond any country in the history and evolution
of IPR protection or violation.
Based on our examination of China’s case, we
may have the following implication for other
emerging markets in which IPR violation is or
may potentially be an issue. First is the importance
of the political system. As discussed by others
(Brander et al., 2017) and us, the rule of law is
key, and a logical extension of this point is that in
order to develop and safeguard the rule of law, the
democratic political system is necessary. Second,
the degree of globalization is important. The more
globalized a country is, the more impact its IPR
violation will have, both domestically and interna-
tionally, as the case of China shows. Third, the size
of the country’s economy matters, as we discussed
earlier. In sum, in descending order, a democratic
and small country that is highly globalized may
improve its IPR protection the fastest, as compared
to a big, undemocratic country with little global-
ization (in the case of China, it is a big, undemo-
cratic country with high globalization).
Most studies on institutional changes in commu-
nist or formerly communist countries normatively
assume that the change is in the direction from
communism to democracy, the rule of law, and the
free market. Few question the direction, and most
study the speed and steps of the change. What
happened in the course of the reform and opening
up in China since the 1970s has put such an
assumption into question: after 40 years of reform,
democracy and the rule of law did not take root in
China, the party’s control on the political, eco-
nomic, and social institutions has been strength-
ened by the newly gained wealth. The implication
of the reversal to the issue of IPR is that, domesti-
cally, the party-state forces foreign firms to transfer
their IPR to domestic producers, and internation-
ally, the party actively participates in the rule-
setting and takes advantages of the rule of law in its
favor. In view of this, we call for new studies on
institutional change that examine the reversal
institutional change or stalled institutional change.
One direction is to extend the institutional duality
framework based on the case of China in which the
dictatorial government of a large country may
enjoy its lawless rule in its home and takes advan-
tage of lawfulness globally to advance its interest,
where the size of the country in question is
particularly important since the dictatorial govern-
ment of a small country does not have enough
impact on the world.
Facing the increasing influence from the party-
state of China, a group of China experts in the U.S.
wrote a report titled Chinese Influence & American
Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance, in which
they recommended three broad principles that
Political economy of China’s IPR Shaomin Li and Ilan Alon
Journal of International Business Policy
* 
should serve as the basis for protecting the demo-
cratic values and the rule of law: transparency,
integrity, and reciprocity (Working Group on Chi-
nese Influence Activities in the United States,
2018). We believe the three principles are also
appropriate for the international business commu-
nity in dealing with the IPR issue with China.
Transparency will not only expose cases of viola-
tions related to China but also encourage victims to
step forward to take action. Upholding integrity is
important because due to the lack of law and a high
level of corruption, doing business in China can
undermine the integrity of foreign firms, weaken-
ing their ability to fight against IPR violation.
Demanding China to be reciprocal is reasonable
and effective. For example, the international com-
munity should be able to disseminate knowledge of
IPR protection in China. In this regard, interna-
tional business journals should make a special
effort to highlight and discuss the issue and
disseminate the rule-of-law’s view on the issue to
the audience worldwide including the ones in
China.
The fact that China heavily relies on global trade
and must do business in other countries can be
viewed as a positive factor in China’s possible
change toward adopting the rule of law. An effec-
tive way for a country to pressure China to follow
the rule of law is to use the law in its own
jurisdiction against violators, including the ones
from China. For example, the EU and U.S. courts
have been successfully taking legal actions against
MNCs that violate laws; prominent cases include
Apple, Facebook, Google, HSBC, Samsung, and
Uber. As for countries whose governments directly
engages in illegal IPR acquisition from other coun-
tries, victimized countries should go one step
further to consider using trade-related sanctions
according to the rule of law to pressure the
offending government to change.
From a game theory perspective, Platteau (1994)
laid out the conditions under which public order-
ing in a free market society can be maintained. An
important condition is the existence of what he
called ‘‘general morality’’, in which ‘‘honest people
are willing to sanction breaches of honesty con-
ventions even when their own interests have not
been harmed by the observed breach’’ (Platteau,
1994: 765). Expanding his argument, we argue that,
in order to maintain IPR in the global market,
member countries need to be willing to oppose any
country’s IPR violations even when they face
retaliation from the violator. In other words,
improving IPR protection needs to be a collective
effort of the world.
Give the size of China’s market, and the strong
retaliation by the party-state toward anyone who
criticizes it, most foreign governments and firms,
especially the small ones, choose not to confront it
for IPR violations. This leads to the classical ‘‘pris-
oner’s dilemma’’ alluded to in the card game above
(an effective way to mitigate the dilemma is for all
the 26 students to band together to bargain with
the teacher). Facing the unfair trade issues with
China, many countries hope that someone else can
lead the effort and they will (quietly) support it.
The only country that can lead the effort appears to
be the U.S., which has played the role of the de
facto leader in the effort. The U.S. government is
demanding China to make ‘‘structural changes’’
including stopping the state’s sponsoring of IP
espionage and forced technology transfer (Lynch,
2018), but at the most fundamental level, the
structural changes may lead to the establishment of
the rule of law and democratization. From a game
perspective, for the U.S. to push China for the
change, there is a considerable cost because the
party-state may resist and retaliate. If China makes
structural changes, initiated either by the party-
state or some other groups, there would be great
payoffs for China as whole, for the U.S., and for the
world, in the long run.
If, fearing losing power, the party-state rejects the
changes, there will be a danger that the party-state
may make China more isolated from the interna-
tional community. The party-state may keep its
absolute rule over China, but China as a whole, the
U.S., and the world may face a cold economic (and
political) war in the long run. An alternative is for
the U.S. not to demand any changes in China.
Then the world trade situation remains in status
quo, the Chinese party-state continues to practice
its unfair trade policy, and all we can do is to hope
that the natural evolutionary view is correct that
the party-state will, miraculously, adopt the rule of
law as the Chinese firms grow stronger and invent
additional new technologies.
NOTES
1We acknowledge that too strong IPR protection
mayhurt thedisseminationof technologies and thus
hurt economic development – we thank one of the
anonymous reviewers for pointing this out. How-
ever, discussing the degree to which China should
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protect IPR is not the focus of this essay. Our
discussion focuses on the enforcement of IPR pro-
tection or violation given the degree of legal IPR
regime, be it strong or weak.
2We would like to thank one of the anonymous
reviewers for pointing these aspects of American
history.
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